Why Putin Knows He Can’t Launch a Full-Scale War
What happens next in Ukraine (As of March 1st)
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What was supposed to happen
In order to understand what Putin will do next in Ukraine, we first need to understand what Putin’s original plan was and why. From what we can tell, Putin’s original plan was akin to the early days of the first Iraq War when George Bush flew to an aircraft carrier and declared “Mission Accomplished.”
Putin’s military forces were supposed to race to the cities using roads, the Ukrainian military would melt away, and there would be a quick regime change in Kyiv. This approach was chosen, as opposed to a full-scale invasion with Russian Battalion Tactical Groups attacking across a broad front and heavy bombardment, because there was (and still is) very little will or ability on the Russian side for a full-scale invasion. Additionally, pummeling Ukrainian cities with artillery undermines Putin’s goal of taking Ukraine intact which would make it easier to incorporate Ukraine into Russia.
As of March 1st, we now know that strategy will not work as there is heavy Ukrainian resistance. But go back a week, and this strategy seemed viable as many Western military leaders predicted a quick Ukrainian collapse. For example, during a 60 Minutes interview on February 20th, the former US Army general who served as the Commanding General for US Army Europe speculated that the Ukrainian government could collapse without Putin even needing to invade.
“I don’t think he [Putin] is going to launch what some people call a full-on invasion, or all-out assault. I just don’t think he needs to do that because he — the continuous economic pressure could choke the government and cause it to collapse.”
— Ben Hodges, Retired US Army General
If senior Western leaders thought that Ukraine would collapse so easily, you can only imagine the fanciful picture Putin’s closest advisors were painting for him. To summarize, the war was supposed to be fast and easy because the Ukrainian government was supposed to fall easily, which was a necessary pre-condition for Putin because he had (and has) very limited support for the war.
What will happen next
“War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”
— Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian general and military theorist
The most important thing to remember is that war is a contest of wills. It’s why insurgencies that are significantly outgunned and outmanned regularly defeat large professional armies. However, that fact is immediately lost on just about everyone when a war starts, especially the media, as it is much more exciting and tangible to count the number of soldiers, tanks, etc., on each side then decide who will win based on will.
Ukraine has a much stronger will to fight. Russian citizens are demonstrating against the war while Ukrainians of all ages are taking up arms. There is a huge difference in the will to fight, a difference which will become even more pronounced as sanctions against Russia begin to take a toll.
In the near term, Russia will most likely start taking theatrical, low-cost, actions moving forward. For example, increasing rocket attacks, displaying images of long convoys headed to major Ukranian cities, and increasing the readiness of their nuclear forces in an attempt to try to intimidate the world and improve their hand at the negotiation table.
However, it’s important to understand that these are bluffs. Putin knows that he can’t achieve his goals using Plan A; he’s now moving to Plan B. Putin is already starting to move the goalposts back so they can claim a victory and go home. Yesterday, Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. seemed to be doing just that, saying:
“The occupation of Ukraine is not part of our plans. The purpose of this special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kyiev regime for eight years. For this, it is necessary to demilitarise and denatzify Ukraine.”
— Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s U.N. Embassador
Putin started with shallow reserves of will and knows it. So how do we continue to decrease Russia’s will to fight?
- We should continue the unprecedented sanctions, which will make the lives of ordinary Russians and oligarchs very difficult. Sanctions will also drive home the message that Russia’s actions are serious, illegal, and undermine the domestic narrative that it is a limited military operation in the Donbas region.
- We should continue to supply Ukraine with as much military and humanitarian aid as possible to make the Russian invasion as costly as possible, further undermining their will to fight.
- We should not take direct and unnecessary military actions like establishing no-fly zones, which are unnecessary, potentially costly, and could provide a narrative for Putin to use to increase Russia’s will to fight.
Additionally:
- We should treat Putin’s theatrical escalations with care, but we should not take them too seriously or make concessions for them.
- We should not assume Putin is willing to take the same drastic actions he took in Chechyna and Syria, because Ukraine is far larger, more culturally similar, and the justification for his actions in Ukraine is razor-thin.
Putin went into the war knowing there was little will to fight and so he pursued a limited strategy. Now that it is clear that Ukraine has thwarted that strategy and there has been a strong international response, he will attempt theatrical moves to strengthen his hand at the negotiation table. However, they should be interpreted as just that, because he knows he can’t launch a full-scale war, and we should know that too.
